BY REMI LADIGBOLU
THE seizure of Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, by United States forces on Saturday has shaken the foundations of the international system.
A foreign military operation struck a sovereign capital and removed a sitting head of state without congressional approval in Washington and without any recognised mandate under international law. This was not merely a dramatic episode in global politics. It exposed how fragile the assumptions underpinning the modern world order have become.
The U.S. has justified the operation by pointing to narcotics allegations. Maduro has been indicted in a federal court in New York on charges that include narco-terrorism conspiracy. Yet international law leaves little room for ambiguity. A sitting president enjoys sovereign immunity while in office. Even if allegations are later substantiated, they do not justify unilateral abduction or the use of force. What occurred was not lawful law enforcement. It was an intervention that cuts directly against the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.
That legal breach is sharpened by political inconsistency. Donald Trump previously pardoned Juan Orlando Hernández, the former Honduran president who had already been convicted in a United States court for narco-terrorism related offences. This decision makes it difficult to accept that Venezuela was targeted out of a genuine commitment to fighting drugs. If narcotics were truly the issue, a convicted offender would not have been forgiven while an alleged one was seized by force. The contrast points to other motives.
Domestic politics provides a clearer explanation, but it is not the only one. The operation fits a familiar pattern often described as Wag the Dog, where dramatic foreign action overwhelms damaging domestic narratives. Trump is under sustained pressure at home. The Epstein files continue to surface in phases, keeping uncomfortable questions alive. The anniversary of January 6 is approaching, a date that remains inseparable from Trump’s political legacy.
January 6 refers to the storming of the United States Capitol in 2021 by supporters seeking to halt the certification of an election Trump had lost. The attack resulted in deaths and injuries and inflicted lasting damage on American democratic norms. Trump has been accused of inciting the unrest through repeated claims that the election was stolen. Each anniversary revives debates about accountability, legitimacy and the resilience of American institutions.
Against this backdrop, the dramatic capture of a foreign president has instantly redirected public attention.
Yet Venezuela also sits at the intersection of long-running ideological battles within American politics. The Cuban- American community in the United States, a crucial Republican voting bloc, has for decades sought the collapse of the Cuban government. Within this community, a deeply held belief persists that Havana’s survival rests on a strategic bargain forged under Hugo Chávez and continued by Maduro. Venezuela, rich in oil revenues, provides financial lifelines. Cuba, in return, supplies Venezuela with medical personnel, intelligence cooperation and technical expertise. From this perspective, toppling the Venezuelan government is not an isolated objective but a means to accelerate the collapse of the Cuban state itself. The Maduro operation therefore resonates not only as foreign policy, but as domestic electoral strategy aimed at a loyal and politically active constituency.
Oil remains the strategic constant beneath both the political theatre and the ideological calculations. Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world. Trump has been explicit about American intentions. US oil companies, he says, will enter Venezuela, rebuild its infrastructure and resume production at scale. Redirecting Venezuelan crude towards the American market would reduce fuel prices and ease inflationary pressures. It would also allow Trump to claim economic success achieved through decisive action abroad. Few political incentives are more powerful.
The urgency of this move was sharpened by developments that surfaced only days before the operation. A Chinese delegation had reportedly been in Venezuela on Friday to discuss plans for Beijing to begin purchasing Venezuelan oil in yuan rather than in dollars. Such a shift would strike at the heart of American economic power. China is not only the largest buyer of Venezuelan oil, but also the largest holder of US bonds and dollar reserves. If China’s need for the dollar declines, the currency’s value and the financial leverage it provides Washington would come under pressure. The timing is difficult to dismiss as coincidence.
Early signals suggest that the United States does not intend to administer Venezuela directly. Reports that the vice president has been sworn in as president point to a managed transition rather than outright occupation. The likely outcome is controlled continuity. A nominally Venezuelan administration would operate under heavy American influence, preserving the appearance of sovereignty while strategic decisions, particularly around oil, are shaped in Washington. This arrangement allows Trump to claim respect for Venezuelan self-rule while retaining effective control.
As the narco-terrorism justification has struggled to gain universal traction, Trump has increasingly framed the operation in economic terms, claiming that Venezuela “stole” American oil and assets and that the intervention was a means of taking back what the United States was owed. His remarks appear to refer to events in 2007, when the government of then- President Hugo Chávez ordered the seizure of oil fields and assets belonging to companies including ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Norway’s Statoil and France’s Total. That move completed a nationalisation process that began in 1976 under President Carlos Andrés Pérez.
What is often omitted from this narrative is that Venezuela’s oil reserves belong unequivocally to Venezuela under both its constitution and international law. A 1962 United Nations resolution on “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources” affirms the inalienable right of states to control their natural wealth in accordance with national interests. Venezuela’s constitution is explicit. Article 12 states that all mineral and hydrocarbon deposits within Venezuelan territory are the property of the Republic and are inalienable. Article 13 goes further, prohibiting the transfer or leasing of territory or sovereign rights to foreign states under any circumstances.
In that light, the claim that Venezuela “stole” US oil is simply false. While an international tribunal later ruled that Venezuela failed to provide adequate compensation to some affected companies, experts continue to disagree on whether this amounted to a violation of international law. What is clear is that neither the United States nor its corporations hold any legal claim to Venezuela’s oil reserves themselves. The distinction between compensation disputes and sovereign ownership has been deliberately blurred to construct a narrative of economic grievance that serves political ends.
The operation has wider consequences. It weakens the US ability to oppose similar actions elsewhere. In international politics, precedent carries weight long after the immediate crisis fades.
American history itself offers a sobering parallel. In the nineteenth century, the United States tried to buy Mexico’s northern territories. Mexico refused. War followed. US forces occupied large areas, installed a compliant leadership and acquired more than half of Mexico’s territory. That land later became California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and parts of Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas and Oklahoma. The expansion transformed the United States into a transcontinental power. The logic behind that episode echoes uncomfortably today.
History offers another striking precedent. Exactly 36 years ago, on January 3, 1990, US forces removed Panamanian President, Manuel Noriega, under accusations including drug trafficking. Noriega was extradited to Miami, where he was tried and convicted. The case illustrates how Washington has long used military power in Latin America under the guise of law enforcement while managing the legal and diplomatic fallout. The Maduro operation fits this historical pattern, but with far greater global stakes given the entanglement of Russia, China and energy markets.
China will view these events through the lens of Taiwan. A large proportion of the advanced computer chips used in the United States are manufactured there. If norms against unilateral force continue to erode, Beijing’s arguments for restraint weaken. China already appears to be the biggest immediate loser in Venezuela. That loss sharpens incentives elsewhere. Taiwan becomes the most obvious pressure point. Even Hong Kong could re-enter strategic calculations as leverage in future negotiations.
Russia, already emboldened in Ukraine, may draw its own conclusions. This is where the situation becomes particularly puzzling. Russia maintains a significant military presence in Venezuela, including aircraft and air defence systems.
